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Abstract
In Dekel and Feinberg (2004) we suggested a test for discovering whether a potential
expert is informed of the distribution of a stochastic process. This category test requires
predicting a \small"{ category I { set of outcomes. In this paper we show that there is
a randomized category test that cannot be manipulated, i.e. such that no matter how
the potential expert randomizes his prediction, there will be realizations where he will
fail to pass the test with probability 1. The set of outcomes where he fails can be made
large { a category II set { under the continuum hypothesis. Moreover, these results
hold for the ¯nite approximations of the category tests where the non-expert is failed
in ¯nite time and the expert is failed with small probability. JEL Classi¯cation: K9
1 Introduction
In Dekel and Feinberg (2004) we suggested a test to determine whether a potential expert
knows the distribution governing a stochastic process. The tester is completely uninformed
and non-Bayesian, in the sense that she does not have a prior distribution over the possible
distributions that govern the stochastic process, nor does she have a prior over the probability
that she is facing an expert. We showed that for each predicted probability measure ¹ there
exists a (category I) set S¹ such that ¹(S¹) = 1 and such that the set of measures that
assign positive probability to S¹ is small, in the sense that it is a category I set of measures
in the space of probability measures.1 Thus \most" predictions other than those made by
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1A category I set of outcomes is a countable union of nowhere dense sets|sets whose closure has an
empty interior.
1an expert who knows the actual distribution will almost surely fail, and the knowledgeable
expert will almost surely pass. We also provided a ¯nite approximation for this test: for any
given " > 0 any prediction can be tested with a set that will fail all but a category I set of
predictions in ¯nite time and will fail the expert with probability of no more than ".
However, an uninformed expert might still be able to make a randomized prediction
that would pass a test with high probability (with respect to his randomized strategy), i.e.,
one could potentially manipulate the test. In this paper we provide a randomized category
test that cannot be manipulated. The randomized test picks a test from the class of tests
developed in our previous work according to a distribution that is known to the potential
expert. However, no matter how an uninformed expert chooses his prediction he will fail
the test on a set of realizations the size of the continuum. To address the concern that
this set|on which a potential manipulator will fail|might nevertheless be small, we show
that (assuming the continuum hypothesis) we can assure that the failure will occur on a
set larger than a category I set, i.e. a set that cannot be covered by a countable union of
nowhere dense sets. This failure will occur with probability 1 with respect to the randomized
category test employed. It turns out that the ¯nite approximation of the randomized test
also is not manipulable: the uninformed expert is assured to fail on a continuum even though
the test must determine the non-expert in ¯nite time while not failing the expert with high
probability.
These results distinguish such \category" tests from the well studied calibration tests
not only in the formal interpretation of what a test is supposed to accomplish, but also in
whether a non-expert can manipulate the test.2 As was shown by Lehrer (2001) a random-
ized calibration test can be passed by a completely uninformed non-expert. Moreover, Kalai,
Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1999), Fudenberg and Levine (1999), Sandroni, Smorodinsky and
Vohra (2003), and Sandroni (2003) provide generalizations and variations of such results to
a large class of tests which raised the question whether an unmanipulable test could actually
exist. In these papers a randomized strategy by the non-expert can pass a randomized cali-
bration test on every realization with probability 1 (with respect to the random prediction).
In contrast, our randomized category test guarantees failure on a set of outcomes that is not
small no matter what randomized strategy the non-expert uses (obviously without hindering
the guarantee that the informed expert will pass the test).
The conceptual idea behind the construction of an unmanipulable random category test is
based on the observation that there are deterministic category tests that can only be passed
on a large set of realizations if the prediction made (whether deterministic or random) has a
speci¯c property. By randomizing over such category tests we can assure that these speci¯c
2See Dawid (1982,1985) and Foster and Vohra (1998) for early papers on calibration.
2restrictions cannot be simultaneously satis¯ed for a collection of tests that are assigned
positive probability. Hence, we build on the unique nature of category tests insofar that
they can be quite demanding in the predictions required from an expert.
2 Testing and manipulation: de¯nitions
Consider the set of realizations of a stochastic process ­ = f0;1g@0 governed by a probability
distribution. Let ¢(­) denote the set of probability measures over ­ endowed with the ¾-
¯eld generated by the ¯nite cylinders. Let t : ¢(­) ¡! 2­ denote a test. The interpretation
is that if a predictor proposes the distribution P then he passes the test t if and only if the
realization ! 2 ­ of the process satis¯es ! 2 t(P).
Calibration tests have been shown to be susceptible to manipulation, in the sense that if
t is a calibration test which satis¯es
P(t(P)) = 1 for every P 2 ¢(­) (1)
then there exists a randomized prediction º 2 ¢(¢(­)) such that, for every ! 2 ­, ºfQj! 2
t(Q)g = 1. In other words, by randomly predicting Q an uninformed predictor will pass
the calibration test t at every realization of the process.3 Furthermore, even if the tester
chooses a calibration test t at random according to some given probability distribution over
the collection of calibration tests, there exists a randomized prediction º that passes the test
with probability one with respect to the randomly selected test at every realization ! and
the randomly selected prediction according to º. In other words, calibration tests can be
manipulated.
Clearly the property in (1) is required of a test if we do not wish to rule out a potential
expert who is actually informed as to the distribution governing the process. In Dekel and
Feinberg (2004) we de¯ned a new class of tests that we now call category tests. This class is
de¯ned as:
TC = fall tests t such that for every P we have t(P) is category I set and P(t(P)) = 1g
(2)
3A typical calibration test in the literature does not apply to an ex ante distribution such as P, but
instead asks for predictions conditional on the history as a realization unveils. The empirical distribution
of the true state ! is then compared to the predictions. Of course the collection of all such conditionals
determines P if one also considers all realizations. A randomized prediction (cf. Foster and Vohra(1998))
randomizes the conditional predictions and corresponds to a randomization º over the space of measures
¢(­). Therefore, the manipulation results can be applied to ex ante predictions as well.
3By de¯nition category tests satisfy the property in (1). The de¯nition in (2) has the
additional property that for every test t 2 TC for any prediction Q the predictor will fail
the test on a large set of realizations|the complement of a category I set which is therefore
a category II set of realizations (note that the complement of a category II set need not
be a category I set). In Dekel and Feinberg (2004) we showed that the class of tests TC is
non-empty and most importantly that the set of measures that assign positive probability
to a category I set is itself a category I set in the space of measures. Hence, it seems di±cult
to pass our category tests without knowing the actual distribution governing the process.
Nevertheless, the question arises whether a non-expert can manipulate tests by using a
randomized prediction, i.e. choosing at random a prediction from ¢(­). We now de¯ne
these notions formally. We say that a predictor can manipulate a test t if there exist a
probability distribution ¹ 2 ¢(¢(­)) such that for all ! 2 ­, with ¹ probability 1 we have
! 2 t(Q). Formally,
¹(fQj! 2 t(Q)g) = 1, for all ! 2 ­. (3)
A random test is a distribution ¸ 2 ¢(TC), where once a prediction P is given the test t is
chosen according to ¸ and applied to the realization.4 A random test ¸ can be manipulated
for sure if there exists a randomized prediction ¹ 2 ¢(¢(­)) such that
¸(ft 2 TCj¹(fQj! 2 t(Q)g) = 1 , for all ! 2 ­g) = 1. (4)
That is, almost all predictions pass almost all tests for every realization. This is a very
strong sense in which manipulation occurs, and as shown by Lehrer (2001), if instead of TC
we considered calibration tests then all randomized calibration tests would be manipulable
in this sense.
If we were to show that the above cannot hold for category tests, then we would be
showing that there is a randomized category test that fails every randomized prediction with
positive probability for some realization. This is a start towards showing that our tests are
not manipulable, but it is a weak result. Instead we show a stronger result: there exist
randomized category tests that fail all randomized predictions with probability 1 (according
to the random measure used for the test and prediction) for \many" realizations. Naturally,
the largest this set of realizations could be is a complement of a category I set, since the true
prediction passes on a category I set of realizations. We have only been able to obtain the
following weaker but still strong result: there is a randomized test that fails all randomized
predictions with probability 1 on an uncountable set of realizations. Moreover, under the
4More preciesly, a random (category) test is given by a ¾-¯eld on TC and a measure on the resulting
¢(TC).
4continuum hypothesis, the set can be made a category II set|a set that cannot be covered
by a countable union of nowhere dense sets.
Formally, there exists a ¾-¯eld on TC and a ¸ 2 ¢(TC) such that for all ¹ 2 ¢(¢(­))
¸(ft 2 TCj9 an uncountable set S ½ ­ such that ¹(fQjS \ t(Q) = ;g) = 1g) = 1. (5)
Hence, not only does the failure to manipulate occur with probability 1, it also occurs on
an uncountable set of realizations. Under the continuum hypothesis, there is a randomized
test such that each of the sets S considered in (5) can be chosen to be category II sets. As
before, the set S may vary with the randomly selected test t.
3 A preliminary result





for every measurable set E. This measure is sometimes refereed to as the \center of gravity"
of the measure ¹. Note that since ­ is a compact metric space so is ¢(­) in the weak*
topology (cf. Theorem 6:4 in Parthasarathy (1967)). By the de¯nition of the weak* topology
we have that for every continuous function f 2 C(­) the functional f(P) =
R
­ f(!)dP(!) is
a continuous functional on ¢(­). In particular the continuous functionals on ¢(­) separate
points. From the convexity and compactness of ¢(­) in the weak* topology we have that
the generalized integral
R
¢(­) Pd¹(P) exists in the sense that for every linear functional ¤





and ¹ ¹ is a probability measure. See Theorems 3:27 and 3:28 in Rudin (1991). Since the










for every continuous function f we have that regularity implies that (6) is well de¯ned.
To see this, consider ¯rst a closed set E, we have that º(E) = inff
R
fdºjf ¸ ÂEg where
ÂE is the characteristic function of E. In particular, this holds for º = ¹ ¹ as well. By
5regularity º(G) = supfº(E)jE is closed, E ½ Gg for every measurable set G. Hence we have
measurability of P(E) for measurable sets E and
R
¢(­) P(E)d¹(P) is de¯ned and coincides
with ¹ ¹ as required.
The following Lemma makes use of this center of gravity measure.
Lemma 1 For every measure ¹ 2 ¢(¢(­)) there exists a test t 2 TC and a category II set
S such that ¹(fP 2 ¢(­)jS
T
t(P) = ;g) = 1.
Hence the measure ¹ leads to failure of the test over a category II set of points. (This
is not the result we seek as the test depends on ¹, but it is an instructive ¯rst step.)
Proof. Given ¹ let ¹ ¹ 2 ¢(­) be de¯ned as in (6).
Let S be a category II set such that ¹ ¹(S) = 0. Such a set exists since for every measure
over ­ we can ¯nd a category I set that has measure 1 and pick S as its complement.
Consider the following test:
tS(P) =
(
any category I set R such that P(R) = 1
a category I set R s.t. R
T
S = ; and P(R) = 1
if P(S) > 0
if P(S) = 0
(9)
The test is well de¯ned since by taking Q to be a category I set such that P(Q) = 1 (which
exists as noted above), then if P(S) = 0 one can set R = Q n S and have the required
category I set for the test.
Since ¹ ¹(S) = 0 we have
R
¢(­) P(S)d¹(P) = 0 and so we must have ¹(fPjP(S) > 0g) = 0
so ¹(fPjP(S) = 0g) = 1 but every P with P(S) = 0 fails the test tS at every ! 2 S as
required.
The idea behind the test constructed in (9) is that the test can force failure on a given
category II set { S { whenever a predicted measure assigns zero probability to the set S.
4 Unmanipulable random category tests
Proposition 2 There exists a randomized test ¸ such that for every ¹ 2 ¢(¢(­)) with
¹-probability 1 the non-expert fails on an uncountable set of points (with ¸-probability 1 with
respect to the distribution over the tests): ¸(ft 2 TCj9 an uncountable set S ½ ­ such that
¹(fQjS \ t(Q) = ;g) = 1g) = 1.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary category test t. For every real number r 2 [0;1] de¯ne the sets
Fr = f! 2 ­j the average of 1's in ! converges to rg: (10)





if P(Fr) > 0
if P(Fr) = 0
(11)
The tests tr are category tests since any subset of a category I set is category I and hence
t(P) n Fr is a category I set. These test also satisfy P(tr(P)) = 1 since t is a category test
and since
P(tr(P)) = P(t(P) n Fr) =
(
P(t(P))
P(t(P) n Fr) = P(t(P))
if P(Fr) > 0
if P(Fr) = 0
(12)
for all P.
Denote by f : [0;1] ¡! ftrgr2[0;1] the map associating with each index r 2 [0;1] a
category test as above. Assume ¯rst that the tests ftrgr2[0;1] are disjoint, i.e. for all r 6= s
we have tr 6= ts. Let ¸ be any non-atomic probability measure over the set of tests ftrgr2[0;1]
as a measure space endowed from the Borel measurable sets on the unit interval, e.g. a
uniform distribution picking the index of the test r 2 [0;1]. Consider any given distribution
¹ 2 ¢(¢(­)) and ¹ ¹ as de¯ned above in (6). The random prediction ¹ will pass a test tr
with positive probability on all but a countable set of !'s only if ¹ ¹(Fr) > 0 since if ¹ ¹(Fr) = 0
then with ¹-probability 1 the measure P selected will satisfy P(Fr) = 0 and will fail on
the uncountable set Fr. Since ¹ ¹ is a probability measure we have that there are at most
a countable number of the disjoint sets Fr to which ¹ ¹ can assign positive probability. But
since ¸ is non-atomic it assigns zero probability to any countable set of indices. In particular
with ¸-probability 1 an index r is chosen such that ¹ ¹(Fr) = 0 and with ¹-probability 1 the
predictor fails on an uncountable set of points.
Now consider the case where the set of tests ftrgr2[0;1] is not disjoint but every test appears
in ftrgr2[0;1] at most a countable number of times. The mapping f : [0;1] ¡! ftrgr2[0;1]
induces a measurable space on ftrgr2[0;1] by de¯ning S ½ ftrgr2[0;1] to be measurable if and
only if f¡1(S) is measurable. Since f¡1(ftrg) is countable we have that every singleton is
measurable. Any non-atomic probability measure ¸ on [0;1] induces a non-atomic probability
measure ¸f on ftrgr2[0;1] by de¯ning ¸f(S) = ¸(f¡1(S)) for every measurable set S ½
ftrgr2[0;1]. As in the previous case, for any measure ¹ 2 ¢(¢(­)) at most a countable
collection of tests can be passed simultaneously on all but a countable set of realizations.
Denote this collection of tests by ¹ S ½ ftrgr2[0;1]. Clearly ¹ S is measurable and ¸f(¹ S) = 0.
Finally, if there is a category test ¹ t such that ¹ t = tr for an uncountable collection of
indices r, then we simply consider the deterministic tests ¹ t. A randomized prediction ¹
7cannot pass the deterministic test ¹ t at all but a countable set of realizations since that will
require that ¹ have an atom in each of the uncountable collection of indices for which ¹ t = tr.
In this case the deterministic category test ¹ t cannot be manipulated.
Remark 3 The tests ftrgr2[0;1] are constructed, so one might (even though we do not) know
which case above they fall into: disjoint, countably many repetitions, or uncountably many
repetitions. If we knew the latter case held, then|as noted|we have the much stronger
result showing a deterministic test that cannot be manipulated on an uncountable set of
realizations.
A set with an uncountable number of points can still be \small." For instance, it might
be a category I set. Our next result assures that a non-expert will fail with probability 1 on
a set of realizations which cannot be covered by a category I set. This result assumes the
continuum hypothesis.
Proposition 4 There exists a distribution ¸ over the set of category tests TC such that for
every ¹ 2 ¢(¢(­)) with ¸-probability one the non-expert fails the test with ¹-probability one
on a category II set of points in ­. Hence
¸(ft 2 TCj9 a category II set S ½ ­ such that ¹(fQjS \ t(Q) = ;g) = 1g) = 1 (13)
Proof. A Lusin set L is an uncountable set such that every uncountable subset of L is of
category II. The existence of such a subset of [0;1] was shown by Lusin (1914). In fact, every
category II set contains a Lusin set (see Proposition 20:1 in Oxtoby (1980)). Furthermore,
from Proposition 20:3 in Oxtoby (1980) we have that under the continuum hypothesis there
exists a continuum of disjoint category II sets and each one of them is a Lusin set.
Denote the continuum of disjoint Lusin sets by F® where ® enumerates over the contin-
uum. Fix an arbitrary test t 2 TC. For each ® we de¯ne the test t® 2 TC as follows:
t®(P) = (t(P) n F®) [ f! 2 F®jP(f!g) > 0g (14)
We need to show that t® as de¯ned in (14) is indeed a category test. First note that if
t(P)\F® = ; then t®(P) = t(P). Otherwise, since F® is a Lusin set we have that t(P)\F®
has at most a countable number of points since t(P) is a category I set which implies that
t(P)\F® is category I. But as a category I subset of a Lusin set it must be countable. Hence




8and we have that P(t®(P)) = P(T(P)) = 1 for all P 2 ¢(­) since the sum in (15) is
countable. Note that t(P) n F® is always a measurable set since we remove a countable,
hence measurable, set from the measurable set t(P). Since t®(P) is always a category I set
(a union of a subset of a category I set with a countable set) we have that t® is a member of
TC as required.
We ¯rst assume that for every ® the set f¯jt® = t¯g is countable. Consider the set of
tests ft®g® as a measurable space induced by the mapping f : [0;1] ¡! ft®g® where the
continuum of indices ® is taken from the unit interval [0;1] endowed with the Borel ¾-¯eld.
As in the proof of Proposition 2 every non-atomic probability measure on [0;1] induces a
non-atomic probability measure on ft®g®. Let ¸ be any non-atomic probability measure over
the continuum of tests ft®g® as derived from the unit interval (as before, every singleton is
measurable in ft®g®). For any given measure ¹ 2 ¢(¢(­)) we have that with ¹ positive
probability a test t® is passed on at least one of the points in the set F® only if ¹ ¹ has at least
one atom in F®. This follows from noting that the test t® at P includes a point from F® if
and only if that point is an atom of P. In other words, for ¹ to pass the test t® we must
have that for at least one ! 2 F®; ¹ ¹(f!g) > 0 and so ¹ must assign positive probability to
measures P with an atom at !.
Since ¹ ¹ has at most a countable number of atoms and the sets F® are disjoint, we have
that with positive ¹-probability only a countable number of tests t® can be passed, since
the sets F® are disjoint and passing each at one point from the set requires an atom in the
set. Hence, with ¸-probability 1 the randomized prediction ¹ will fail on a category II set of
points.
The second case we need to consider is when there is a test ¹ t with an uncountable set of
indices in [0;1] assigned to ¹ t. The deterministic category test ¹ t cannot be manipulated on
all but a category I set of realizations since a randomized prediction ¹ 2 ¢(¢(­)) would be
required to have distinct atoms for each of the uncountable set of indices corresponding to ¹ t.
The proof so far considered the set of realizations to be [0;1]. To complete the proof we
need to show that there exists a Lusin set in ­ = 2@0: This result is proven in the appendix.
The random category test that cannot be manipulated was constructed by randomly
choosing among a continuum of tests. These tests were associated with large (category
II) disjoint sets that can only be passed if the prediction has an atom in these sets (more
precisely, the center of gravity of the prediction must have an atom there). Since at most a
countable number of these conditions can be simultaneously passed by an uninformed expert,
we have that any non-atomic measure over such a set of tests guarantees the inability to
manipulate, and hence leads to failure on a category II set. We do not know if there is a
9deterministic category test that guarantees failure, even at a single realization.
4.1 Finitely determined tests
There is naturally an interest in ¯nitely determined tests5. Finitely determined category tests
t are those where t(P) is a closed and nowhere dense set and hence for every realization ! not
in t(P) the test will fail in ¯nite time. Obviously, these tests can only satisfy P(t(P)) > 1¡".
We conclude by showing that there is a randomization over ¯nitely determined category tests
that cannot be manipulated. Moreover, the randomization is over tests that share the same
level of accuracy " in determining the expert.
For every t 2 TC and every " > 0 we de¯ned in Dekel and Feinberg (2004) a test
t" : ¢(­) ¡! 2­ such that P(t"(P)) ¸ 1¡" and t"(P) is a closed and nowhere dense set for
every P 2 ¢(­). Furthermore, t"(P) ½ t(P) for all P, so for every " and t 2 TC there is a
¯nitely determined test t". These ¯nitely determined tests are " approximations of category
tests.
Proposition 5 There exists a distribution ¸ over TC such that for every " > 0 for every
¹ 2 ¢(¢(­)) with ¸-probability 1 the prediction will fail the induced ¯nitely determined
randomly chosen test t" on an uncountable (or category II under the continuum hypothesis)
set of points with ¹-probability 1. Formally:
¸(ft 2 TCj9 uncountable/category II set St ½ ­ such that ¹(fQjS \ t"(Q) = ;g) = 1g) = 1
(16)
Proof. Let ¸ be as in Proposition 2 (resp. Proposition 4 if the continuum assumption
is made), that is, a probability measure over a class of category tests from TC as a mea-
surable space (where the class and measurable space are according to Propositions 2 and 4
respectively). Since t"(P) ½ t(P) we have that
fP 2 ¢(­)jSt \ t"(P) = ;g ¾ fP 2 ¢(­)jSt \ t(P) = ;g: (17)
Applying (17) for the corresponding sets St|either St = Fr when t = tr as in Proposition 2
or St = F® when t = t® as in Proposition 4|we have
¹(fP 2 ¢(­)jSt \ t"(P) = ;g) ¸ (18)
¹(fP 2 ¢(­)jSt \ t(P) = ;g) = 1 (19)
5For example, calibration tests are de¯ned as limits of such ¯nitely observed events.
10where the ¯nal equality follows from the corresponding proposition and choice of sets St.
Hence
¸(ft 2 TCj¹(fP 2 ¢(­)jSt \ t"(P) = ;g) = 1g) ¸ (20)
¸(ft 2 TCj¹(fP 2 ¢(­)jSt \ t(P) = ;g) = 1g) = 1 (21)
where the ¯nal equality follows from the corresponding proposition for the in¯nite tests
above.
This uniform projection of a randomized category test to a randomization over ¯nitely
determined tests with the same level of accuracy demonstrates that no-manipulation results
for in¯nite tests can be translated to no-manipulation results for ¯nite approximations. Here,
the ¯nite approximation of a randomly chosen category test provides a test that identi¯es
the non-expert in ¯nite time and assures failure on a large set|an uncountable set, or even
a category II set under the continuum hypothesis.
5 Appendix
Proof that there exists a Lusin set in ­. The proof follows from viewing points in
­ = 2@0 as the dyadic (binary) expansion of points in [0;1]. The dyadic expansion of the
points in a Lusin set L ½ [0;1] must be a Lusin set in ­ = 2@0.
The dyadic expansion is unique for all but a countable set of points in [0;1]. Assume by
contradiction that the set of dyadic expansions of members of L, which we denote by ¹ L, is
not a Lusin set in ­. Then we could ¯nd an uncountable category I subset of ¹ L in 2@0. It
su±ces to show that the inverse of the dyadic expansion maps a closed nowhere dense set in
­ to a closed nowhere dense set in [0;1] (hence a countable union of such sets will be mapped
to at most a countable union of such sets). This will show that a category I set is mapped
to a category I set and will contradict L being a Lusin set since the dyadic expansion and
its inverse maps uncountable sets to uncountable sets.
Consider a closed set S ½ ­. Since S is closed under the product topology its map
under the inverse of the dyadic expansion is closed; this is because convergence of the dyadic
expansion implies convergence in [0;1]. We need to show that if S is nowhere dense in ­ its
preimage is nowhere dense in the interval. Consider any point in the interval and any open
neighborhood of that point. Since the dyadic open intervals generate the same topology
generated by open intervals we can ¯nd a dyadic interval in the open neighborhood which
contains the point. The dyadic interval is open in ­ and hence contains points outside the
nowhere dense set S. Hence these points are mapped in the inverse of the dyadic expansion
11to points in the dyadic interval. We conclude that every point in [0;1] has points from
outside the image of S in any open neighborhood and the image of S is therefore nowhere
dense as required.
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